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Confronting the sacred cow: 
The politics of work-related tax 
deductions 
Richard Eccleston*
A common theme among recent proposals to reform Australia’s personal income 
tax system is that lower personal income tax rates (or increased thresholds) could 
be partially funded through the elimination of work-related tax deductions. While 
such base broadening represents good tax policy in that a well-designed reform 
package has the potential to improve the efficiency of the income tax system without 
necessarily reducing progressivity, the analysis presented in this article suggests that 
such proposals are fraught with political difficulties.
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Calls to reform Australia’s tax system have once again gained centre 
stage in national political debate. The focus of recent proposals has been 
on broadening the personal income tax base by funding lower personal 
income tax rates through the removal of existing income tax expenditures 
and deductions.
The purpose of this article is not to assess the case for reforming Australia’s 
income tax system, but to provide in-depth political analysis of one aspect 
of the broader income tax reform agenda, namely proposals to eliminate 
work-related income tax deductions (WRDs). While some commentators 
argue that income tax cuts should be made unilaterally, the vast majority 
advocate some form of base broadening, or funding income tax cuts through 
the elimination of existing income tax expenditures and deductions. Such 
proposals have both political and economic advantages. If reforms can be 
presented as being revenue neutral, it tends to simplify the politics of reform 
by avoiding debates about the appropriate level of taxation. Secondly, base 
broadening by definition will improve the neutrality of a tax system because 
such reforms involve eliminating the various concessions and exemptions 
that distort economic decision-making. While the economic and political 
merits of tax concessions continue to be debated, reforms which improve 
a tax system’s neutrality enjoy popularity because they are consistent with 
the prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy (Steinmo 2003, Swank 2004).
Given that a number of high profile advocates of broadening the 
Australia’s income tax base have made specific calls to partially fund tax 
cuts through the elimination of work related deductions, this paper will 
examine the politics of such a proposal (Turnbull & Temple 2005; Freebairn 
2005; Koutsoukis & Gordon 2005; Coleman 2005a). It begins with the 
existing literature on the growth and extent of work-related deductions 
in Australia before examining possible causes of their rapid growth. The 
paper then examines the case for reforming the current treatment of work-
related deductions, before providing more detailed political analysis and 
some comparative perspectives. 
The origins of work-related deductions
Personal income taxes were the most significant revenue-raising instrument 
among in developed economies over the 20th Century, and this is especially 
so in Australia with such taxes raising approximately 40% of total revenue 
(OECD 2004, 18). While precise definitions of income are both elusive and 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most draw on American economist 
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Henry Simons’ (1938) notion of income being the sum of consumption 
and accumulated wealth over a given period of time. In an ‘ideal’ and 
comprehensive income tax system, any income, regardless of whether it is 
derived from wages, capital gains, fringe benefits or gifts, should be taxed 
equally – or in the words of the influential Carter Commission into the 
Canadian tax system ‘A buck is a buck is a buck’ (Sandford 2000, 42). 
However, it is important to note that even the comprehensive income tax 
base proposed by Simons and promoted by the generation of public finance 
economists that followed, excluded consumption incurred in the process 
of earning income. Just as corporate income is broadly defined as revenue 
less costs (fixed and variable) associated with running a corporation, the 
costs associated with earning a wage should also be deductible. This general 
principle that taxable income should be defined as gross income less costs 
remains a central features of income tax legislation across the world and is 
still reflected in Treasury’s definition of taxable income:
An entity’s income is defined as the increase in the entity’s 
economic wealth (stock of assets) between two points in time, 
plus the entity’s consumption in that period. Consumption 
includes all expenditures, except those incurred in earning or 
producing income. (Treasury 2005, 20 – emphasis added) 
This excursion into the somewhat arcane world of public finance theory 
is instructive because it establishes that work-related tax deductions have 
their origins in the public finance orthodoxy of the post-war period, and 
were not a form of the politically motivated tax expenditure which became 
embedded in some national tax systems. As we shall see below, despite the 
elimination of work-related deductions in New Zealand in the early 1990s 
and attempts to limit them in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Evans 2004, 178), generally speaking, work-related tax deductions are a 
common feature of most mature income tax systems. 
The growth of work-related tax deductions in Australia
Work-related tax deductions have long been a feature of Australia’s personal 
income tax system, yet it has only been in recent years that their cost and 
consequences have attracted serious scrutiny. The primary reason for this 
reassessment has been the dramatic growth in WRDs since the early 1990s, 
with average claims increasing by 7% per annum between 1993-94 and 
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2000-01 to reach a total of  $8.8 billion (Warren 2004, 159; Figure 1). 
According to the latest data, this trend appears to have continued unabated 
with 6.8 million taxpayers claiming a total $10.7 billion in WRD in 2003-
04 (ATO 2005a, 10).
Figure 1. Total work-related deductions claimed and average 
work-related deductions per claimant, from 1993-2004. ATO 
(2005a, 2005b)
It is difficult to establish the precise amount of revenue foregone as the 
result of such deductions, because while the data reveals the extent of 
deductions claimed, we are forced to estimate the marginal tax rate that 
claimants were confronting.1 As a result, estimates for the 2001-02 year (in 
which deductions amounted to $9.3 billion) ranged from $3 to $3.5 billion 
(Freebairn 2005, 3) to $4.7 billion (CPA 2005; see also Turnbull & Temple 
2005, 23). In line with Freebairn’s estimation, analysis conducted on the 
most recent data (2002-03) for this article puts the estimate at $3.8 billion 
(Figure 2 and Table 1).
1 The situation is compounded by the fact that while the deductions data is sorted by 
income, the income sets do not coincide with existing tax rate thresholds. There is also 
a threshold effect in that deductions may result in a taxpayer moving to a lower tax 
bracket, which also makes it difficult to calculate the exact tax saved through claiming 
deductions.
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Figure 2. Estimates of average tax saved per taxpayer and total 
tax saved, by taxpayer income 2002-03 (ATO 2005b)2
Regardless of debates about the exact cost of   WRDs to the Commonwealth 
Budget, there is a consensus that the revenue involved is considerable and 
growing faster than income tax revenue. Indeed, given the threat such 
growth poses to the integrity of the Australian tax system, the issue attracted 
the interest of the ATO well before advocates of income tax base broadening 
suggested that WRDs could be used to fund reforms. Initially the ATO 
tightened the criteria and substantiation requirements for claims. In early 
2005 the ATO escalated its compliance effort when Tax Commissioner 
Michael Carmody openly warned taxpayers of increasing auditing activity 
in relation to WRDs (Anderson 2005, ATO 2005a, 7). In order to assess the 
likely impact of more rigorous enforcement measures it is first necessary to 
establish the underlying causes of the recent growth in WRDs.
2 The following assumptions were made to group ATO deductions data by 2002-03 tax 
brackets: 1) Of taxpayers earning less than $10, 000 it was assumed that 50% earned 
less than $6000 and 50% between $6000 and 10,000. 2) The 1.5% Medicare levy was 
added to the marginal tax rate of those earning above $20, 000. 3) Of wage earners 
with a taxable income of between $50,000 and $100,000, it was assumed that 50% 
were in the $50, 000 - $60, 000 tax bracket (42%) and 50% in the $60, 000 plus (47%) 
bracket. Such assumptions will result in a tendency to underestimate the value of 
WRDs. See also Table 1.
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BRACKET CREEP AND INCREASING MARGINAL TAX RATES
One of the central drivers of increasing WRD claims is undoubtedly 
the fact that over the past decade nominal wage increases have exceeded 
periodic income tax cuts. This has resulted in a net ‘bracket creep’ effect 
for the vast majority of taxpayers. As a consequence, marginal tax rates 
confronting wage earners have tended to increase, providing greater financial 
incentives to claim deductions. For example, Warren (2004, 109) finds that 
the percentage of taxpayers confronting what was then the highest (47%) 
personal tax rate between 1994-95 and 1999-2000 almost doubled from 
9.2% to 17.1% (or approximately 1.5 million taxpayers). While income 
tax cuts associated with the ANTS package (introduced 2000-01) and 
initiatives announced in the 2004 election campaign and 2005-06 budget 
have, for the short term at least, cut these numbers significantly, in the 
absence of indexation the number of wage earners confronting the 42% 
and 47% income tax rates will once again climb steadily over time. These 
recent reforms aside, overall the 1990s saw an unprecedented number 
of Australian wage earners paying the highest marginal tax rate, which 
seems likely to have provided incentives to maximise WRDs. The fact 
that deduction claims did not decline with recent tax cuts suggests that 
financial incentive effects in isolation cannot explain taxpayer behaviour, 
with assessment procedures, the nature of professional advice, and other 
cultural factors also contributing to the substantial growth of WRDs over 
the past decade.
SELF-ASSESSMENT AND PROFESSIONAL ADVICE
Classical economic theory suggests that rational taxpayers would pursue 
all legal (and perhaps illegal depending on the nature of enforcement and 
sanctions) means of reducing their tax liability, up to the point where 
the costs of such tax evasion exceeded the tax saved. In reality, a host of 
sociological factors influence economic behaviour generally, and taxpayer 
compliance in particular. One important factor in shaping taxpayer 
compliance is the manner in which the state administers the tax code 
– the complexity of underlying law, the compliance procedures required 
by the state and enforcement measures and sanctions employed to detect 
and punish non-compliance.
Australia, like most industrialised countries, has a mature and relatively 
efficient taxation system. However, since the late 1980s there has been 
an increasing focus on streamlining tax administration with a view to 
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reducing compliance burdens (Australian National Audit Office 1984). 
One of the most significant reforms was the introduction of a system of 
self-assessment for determining income tax liabilities. Introduced in 1986-
87, self-assessment placed the onus on taxpayers (or their agents) to apply 
the relevant tax law to their circumstances and calculate their subsequent 
tax liability (Treasury 2004). Significantly, self-assessment involves the 
ATO accepting the taxpayers claims at face value, with only a small 
minority of lodgements being subjected to detailed audit (Dirkis & Payne-
Mulcahy 2002). The advantage of self-assessment is that it streamlines tax 
administration by freeing up ATO staff from routine assessment processes 
allowing them to focus on educating taxpayers and areas of perceived 
compliance risk (Treasury 2004). Beyond the specific criticisms to which 
self-assessment has been subject by tax professionals,3 it can be argued that 
Australia’s self-assessment regime may have contributed to the growth in 
WRDs for a number of reasons.
A central feature of self-assessment is that it places a greater reliance on 
the voluntary compliance of taxpayers. While concentrating enforcement 
efforts on areas of high compliance risk has generally been a successful 
strategy relative to the ‘token enforcement’ which occurred prior to self-
assessment (Braithwaite 2005, 69), the ATO’s current compliance strategy 
relies on the goodwill of the vast majority of taxpayers who are subject to a 
‘low intensity’ verification strategy.4 In 2003-04 of the 6.8 million individual 
taxpayers claiming WRDs, 16,000 (0.25%) were asked to provide additional 
information while only 4000 (or one in 1700) were audited (ATO 2005a, 
10). Despite the ATO’s greater investment in taxpayer education, there is 
reason to believe that taxpayer morality may have declined over the period, 
which, when combined with the liberal enforcement regime described 
above, may be contributing to significant revenue leakage. Perhaps mindful 
of the escalating cost of work-related deductions, in recent years the ATO 
has identified the monitoring of work-related expenses and claims as a 
‘headline’ compliance issue requiring increased education and enforcement 
efforts (ATO 2005a, 7).
3 Concerns revolve around the fact that self-assessment places the onus on the taxpayer to 
apply inherently complicated tax law and the uncertainty surrounding private rulings. 
Such concerns culminated in the Federal Government Review of self-assessment 
(Dirkis, M. & Payne-Mulcahy , Treasury 2004).
4 Part of the problem with revenue leakage from work-related deductions is that the 
compliance risk is spread millions of tax payers. So while individual audits may not be 
cost effective, the overall impact on the revenue is still significant.
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Even if the vast majority of Australian wage earners don’t deliberately 
abuse the self-assessment system, a number of practitioners have argued 
that self-assessment may perpetuate the unintentional over-claiming of such 
deductions (Williams 2003; Dirkis, & Payne-Mulcahy, 2002). The problem 
arises because of the widely held misconception that receipt of a Notice of 
Assessment indicates that the ATO has checked and approved all claims made 
in a given tax return (Williams 2003; Murphy & Bing 2002; D’Ascenzo & 
Poulakis 2002). As a result, under a self-assessment regime there is potential 
for taxpayers to inadvertently continue over-claiming deductions, believing 
they had approved by the ATO in a previous return.
The final way in which self-assessment may be contributing to the growth 
of WRDs is through the increase in demand for professional tax services 
it has created. As was mentioned above, self-assessment places the onus on 
taxpayers to apply the tax code to their particular circumstances. Given 
this responsibility, taxpayers have increasingly relied upon professional tax 
advice, creating a tripartite relationship between taxpayers, tax professionals 
and the ATO.  In contrast to the late 1980s, when approximately 60% (1986-
87) of individual taxpayers used an agent to prepare their returns (Pope et 
al 1990), a decade later (1996-97) this figure had increased to over 81% 
(ATO 1997).5 Taxpayers should not be criticised for seeking professional 
advice to maximise the deductions to which they are legally entitled; 
indeed the practice is actively encouraged by the ATO because it leads to 
the lodgement of more accurate returns. However, a likely consequence of 
this trend is that fewer taxpayers will under claim the deductions to which 
they are entitled contributing to the overall growth of WRDs.
THE CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE
Taxation is among the most coercive activities undertaken by modern 
governments. Reflecting this, American tax compliance expert Joel 
Slemrod mused:
The puzzle is not to explain why people evade, but rather why 
people pay taxes – in the context of the standard economic 
model, people who voluntarily comply are exhibiting nothing 
short of pathological honesty. (Slemrod 1998, 485 as quoted in 
Smith 2004, 180). 
5 Although it must be noted that this Figure had dropped back to 74% by 2002-03 as a 
result of the ATO’s successful e-tax initiative.
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The reason, of course, why governments generally manage to raise billions 
of dollars worth of taxes without resorting to punitive sanctions is because 
the vast majority of taxpayers regard taxation as being legitimate. Indeed, as 
history has demonstrated over the millennia, when the legitimacy of a tax 
system is questioned by a significant portion of the population either because 
of the manner in which it is levied, or because of the way in which is spent, 
then a government’s prospects for survival are extremely bleak (Webber & 
Wildavsky; Mann 1993). Margaret Levi (1988; Braithwaite 2004) coined 
the phrase ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ to describe the fact that while tax 
systems are backed by enforcement measures and sanctions, they can only 
function effectively if the vast majority of  citizens are willing to pay their 
fair share of taxes. Based on extensive comparative research, Levi (1988, 53-
54) argues that quasi-voluntary compliance relies on both the legitimacy of 
government and, significantly, the actions of fellow citizens. The key point 
here is that if there are widespread perceptions that a significant group of 
citizens are avoiding their fair share of taxes, then the normally compliant 
majority will be less likely to do the right thing. Such a dynamic can 
lead to a rapid decline in taxpayer morality and severely compromise the 
integrity of a national tax system. 
Subsequent research has generally affirmed Levi’s hypothesis, with 
Steinmo (2003) arguing that mass dissatisfaction with the tax system 
inevitably creates an acute policy problem for government and pushes tax 
reform to centre stage as a political issue. In Australia in the early 1970s, 
increasing publicity about rampant tax avoidance by the rich, while wage 
earners were facing increasing tax burdens, prompted the Asprey Inquiry 
into the Australian tax system (Groenewegen 1982, 7; Eccleston 2004, 55-
56). Similarly, in the United States, growing awareness of the abuse of tax 
expenditures contributed to the momentum of the tax reform movement 
(Surrey 1973).
Has there been a decline in quasi-voluntary compliance and taxpayer 
morality in Australia over the past decade? While the detailed survey 
evidence required to answer this question is beyond the scope of this 
paper, pioneering Australian research by Wenzel (2001b, 2004) does tend 
to suggest that the compliance behaviour of individuals is influenced by 
their perceptions of the compliance behaviour of other taxpayers. What is 
clear is that over recent years there has been more public discussion of tax 
avoidance and evasion in Australia which may have contributed to a wider 
decline in the culture of compliance among wage earners. 
12   (2006) 21 AUSTRALIAN TAX FORUM
Significant developments which may have contributed to a decline in 
taxpayer compliance have included the Howard’s Government’s reluctance 
to prevent the use of discretionary trusts for tax planning purposes (Fabro 
2002, 2004), the concessional taxation of capital gains on assets held 
for more than 12 months, and the taxation implications of the growing 
gap between the rate at which corporate and personal income is taxed 
(Ganghof & Eccleston 2004). In combination, these developments have 
heightened perceptions that the Australian income tax system has moved 
from being comprehensive to effectively becoming a two-tiered system in 
which PAYE salary earners pay higher levels of taxation than self-employed 
professionals and contractors. Such perceptions reached a high point in the 
recent debate concerning the need to broaden the income tax base when 
Malcolm Turnbull candidly expressed the view that:
Anyone with substantial business income or interests is able 
right now to structure their affairs so that most of their income 
is earned through companies, which pay tax at 30 per cent. Our 
tax system has been designed to ensure that, by and large, the 
only people who pay the top rate of tax are…..PAYE taxpayers 
or professionals. (Turnbull 2005)
According to Levi’s theory (1988) of quasi-voluntary compliance, this 
growing awareness of the use of trusts and corporate structures for tax 
minimisation creates an environment in which ordinary wage earners are 
going to be less willing to comply with the tax code. While such claims are 
difficult to substantiate, it is certainly plausible that a decline in taxpayer 
morality, caused by the phenomena described above, may be contributing 
to growth in WRDs – the one avenue by which employees can minimise 
their tax obligations.
While it is impossible to establish a definitive cause of the recent growth 
in WRDs it seems likely that economic incentives, new administration 
practices and the more general culture of tax compliance in Australian 
have contributed to the trend. The fact that broadening the income tax 
base would reduce both the number of taxpayers confronting the highest 
marginal tax rates and the growing ‘rate gap’ between personal and corporate 
income taxes lends support to the claim that such reforms would enhance 
the integrity of Australia’s personal income tax system. 
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Reforming work-related deductions
Work-related expenses have been exempt from personal income tax both 
in Australia and abroad largely because of the established concept that tax 
should only be levied on net income. However, as the Australian income tax 
system has become more complex and the value of WRDs have escalated, a 
number of credible arguments for their abolition have been advanced.
First and foremost is the claim that abolishing WRDs would increase 
revenue by up to  $4 to $5 billion,6 taxes which could be used to fund 
significant reductions in the personal income tax rates. For example, Labor 
MP Craig Emerson’s proposal to abolish the second highest (42%) income 
tax bracket, would result in an estimated 97% of  taxpayers paying a marginal 
rate of 30% or less and would cost an estimated $5 billion (Emerson 2005). 
Similarly, one of Malcolm Turnbull’s preferred reform options is a three 
rate regime with rates of 15%, 30% and 35% (along with an increased 
tax-free threshold) would cost approximately $5.45 billion (Turnbull & 
Temple 2005). Clearly such changes are significant and have the potential 
to improve work incentives, labour supply, migration and the many other 
benefits promoted by proponents of income tax base broadening. Indeed, 
the most recent modelling published by the Melbourne Institute suggests 
that income tax cuts of this magnitude could generate up to 80,000 new 
jobs (Coleman 2005b). However, the important debate about the benefits 
of base broadening to one side, there are specific benefits associated with 
eliminating WRDs.
A taxation system in which almost seven million taxpayers claim WRDs 
will create a significant compliance burden. Indeed, the very existence of 
a regime in which wage earners have the potential to claim a host of 
work-related expenses, many of which are outlined in industry-specific 
special rulings, creates demand for professional tax services and increases 
the compliance burden on salary earners. Whilst the compliance issues 
surrounding work-related deductions are not as severe as those associated 
with capital gains tax and negative gearing, in combination these three 
elements of Australia’s income tax system contribute (along with self-
assessment discussed above) to between 70% and 80% of wage earners 
seeking professional tax advice. In 2002-03 the total cost of managing tax 
affairs claimed against personal income exceeded $1 billion (ATO 2005b, 
6 Recall that while the estimate presented in Table 1 was $3.8 billion for 2003-04, given 
the historical growth of WRDs this implies a level of approximately $5 billion in 2006-
07.
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Table 3.2). Indeed the level of spending on the preparation of personal 
income tax returns is such that the prominent accounting organisation, 
CPA Australia, recently noted that while ‘the case for reviewing WRDs 
is arguably strong’ any move to eliminate such deductions would have a 
significant impact on tax agents who relied heavily on preparing personal 
income tax returns (CPA 2004, 29-30). 
A broader concern with WRDs relates to established critiques of tax 
expenditures more generally, in that WRDs represent public subsidies that 
lack the transparency of direct expenditures made through the budget 
process (Surrey 1973). By far the most significant class of WRDs are those 
concerning work-related travel ($4.0 billion in 2002-03) and uniforms ($1.0 
billion) which raises issues about whether it is appropriate for government 
to subsidise costs which should arguably be borne by employers (ATO 
2005b, Table 3.3).7 Even if there is a clear public benefit from such subsidies, 
which may be the case with work-related self-eduction expenses in the 
midst of a national skills crisis, critics of tax expenditures argue that such 
policy goals would be better met through the use of direct subsidies.
Finally, based on our earlier discussion of quasi-voluntary compliance, 
it can be argued that creating a taxation system in which ever-increasing 
numbers of taxpayers are claiming WRDs may contribute to the further 
erosion of taxpayer morality and a decline in taxpayer compliance. Just as 
evidence of non-wage earners employing aggressive tax evasion strategies 
may prompt wage earners to maximise their claimed deductions, evidence 
that WRDs are growing rapidly (now approaching $1500 per taxpayer) 
may compound the problem as remaining taxpayers question whether 
their fellow taxpayers are paying their fair share of the tax burden. As Levi 
argues:
Dissatisfaction with the contract will have only a slight initial 
impact on compliance, especially among those whose only 
motivation for compliance is coercion. However, as dissatisfaction 
increases, more people will consider non-compliance. As people 
break the law and get away with it, more people are likely to 
begin to break the law. (Levi 1988, 53-54)
7 It should be noted that if employers did provide compensation for work related 
expenses then in many cases firms would be able to claim such costs against their 
taxable income. The result would be that the deduction would simply move from the 
personal income tax base to the corporate tax base. Thanks to the reviewer of this 
paper for making this point.
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While such claims are inevitably difficult to verify empirically, it is important 
to remember that perceptions of exploitation do the damage – once the 
tax contract is regarded as being unfair non-compliance follows. Such 
arguments imply that Australia’s relatively liberal WRDs regime may in fact 
be contributing to a ‘snowball’ effect, creating a culture of non-compliance 
and significantly undermining the integrity of the Australian tax system. 
If this is the case, then removing WRDs (along with the aggressive tax-
minimisation strategies employed by non-wage earners) would enhance 
the legitimacy and integrity of the Australian tax system. 
The politics of reforming work-related deductions
While eliminating work-related deductions would represent ‘good policy’ 
from the dominant neo-liberal perspective that promotes neutrality as a 
tax design criteria, this is not to say that abolishing WRDs represents good 
politics (Freebairn 2005; Warren 2004). Indeed, as the majority of political 
scientists will argue, the policy process is anything but rational, with ideas, 
interests, established institutions and past patterns of politics all shaping 
political dynamics. This is especially true of highly contested policy arenas, 
such as taxation, where political decisions have a profound effect on large 
segments of the community. 
THE POLITICS OF BASE BROADENING
One of the main structural problems confronting governments who wish 
to improve the overall efficiency of  a tax system by reining in concessions 
available to select groups of taxpayers (the central objective of base broadening 
proposals), are what Mancur Olsen (1965) described as ‘collective action’ 
problems. Even when there is a consensus that such reforms are in the 
national interest, interest group politics is such that actors who stand to lose 
tax subsidies have the greatest incentive to mobilise politically to protect 
their tax concessions. In contrast, there are few community organisations 
to fight for the integrity of tax systems and the national interest more 
generally. Often, when confronted with such pressures, governments tend 
to preserve established concessions rather than alienating powerful political 
interests (Resse 1980; Wilson 1980).
This is not to say that base broadening is impossible. Indeed the global 
wave of tax reform which occurred since the 1980s defied the predictions 
of the political sceptics as government created a constituency for tax reform. 
However, the fact remains that it is difficult to make the transition from 
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what Guy Peters (1991) has called ‘self-interest’ politics, which he argues 
is the normal state of affairs in the tax policy arena, to a more collectivist 
‘public interest politics’ in which in which actors are prepared to sacrifice 
concessions to achieve reforms considered to be in the national interest. 
Just as a governments, both in Australia and abroad, have confronted 
collective action problems when they have attempted to introduce base 
broadening reforms, proposals to eliminate WRDs seem likely to face 
similar challenges. Clearly, removing the right of seven million taxpayers to 
claim deductions worth, on average, $700 per annum, has the potential to 
alienate a massive political constituency. While it is important to note such 
general arguments, ultimately the politics will be shaped by the details of 
any reform proposal. It is to this level of analysis which we now turn.
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS
Taxation is more than a means of raising revenue and historically one of 
the main ancillary objectives of tax systems has been to redistribute wealth. 
Indeed progressive income taxation based on the principle of ‘ability to 
pay’ was one of the cornerstones of the Keynesian welfare state. While 
Keynesian economics may no longer be in vogue, we only need consider 
the recent Australian debate concerning the GST to see that distributional 
implications of tax reforms continue to ignite political passions invoking 
the rhetoric of class politics. Given the risks associated with reforms which 
significantly alter the distribution of the tax burden across income groups 
(such as the collective action problem noted above), it would be politically 
desirable if the elimination of WRDs did not alter the incidence of taxation. 
This would mean that income tax cuts funded through the elimination of 
WRDs would have to serve as compensation for deductions relinquished. 
If this could be achieved then it would allow policy makers to argue that 
reforms are improving the efficiency of the tax system without influencing 
the distribution of the tax burden.
While there are limitations to the data provided, it is apparent from Table 
1 that the major beneficiaries of WRDs are wage earners in the upper 
tax brackets. In 2002-03 the 21% workers earning above $50,000 reaped 
over 60% of the real benefits of WRDs. At the other end of the income 
spectrum the 35% of workers who earned less than $20, 000 received 
3.6% of the benefits. Such data strongly supports Freebairn’s (2005) claim 
that eliminating WRDs would improve the progressivity of the Australia’s 
income tax system. Given the incidence of WRDs, it is highly likely that a 
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revised income tax rate structure that focused on reducing the higher rates 
and/or thresholds (perhaps with a modest increase to the tax free threshold) 
could be devised such that there was little net redistributive effect. 
Table 1. Estimates of average tax saved per taxpayer and total tax 
saved, by taxpayer income 2002-03 (ATO 2005b). See footnote 
#3 for assumptions
Tax 
bracket
No. of 
taxpayers 
(million)
% 
taxpayers
Total 
WRD
($ billion)
Approx 
marginal 
tax rate
Total tax 
saved 
($ billion)
Average 
saving per 
person ($)
% of 
total tax 
saved
< $10K 1.801 16.9% 0.1863 8.5% 0.0158 8.70 0.4%
$10-20K 1.867 17.5% 0.7374 17% 0.1253 67.10 3.2%
$20-50K 4.731 44.4% 4.382 31.5% 1.380 291.60 36.3%
$50-60K 0.951 8.90% 1.908 43.5% 0.830 872.20 21.8%
$60+ K 1.304 12.2% 2.993 48.5% 1.451 1,112.90 38.1%
Totals 10.654 1.021 3.802
It would certainly be politically desirable if a proposal to eliminate WRDs 
could be linked to income tax reforms, such that the total package could 
be credibly presented as being revenue neutral, both overall and in terms 
of its distributional impact. However, a number of political risks remain. 
Firstly, any such claims are only based on aggregates and clearly individual 
taxpayers who make above-average WRD claims will be worse off and 
inevitably remain a point of vulnerability for any reformist government. 
In this sense base broadening of this type will fall short of being Pareto 
optimal.
The elimination of WRDs may also prompt wage earners to consider 
whether they are being treated fairly relative to other taxpayers. There is a 
real political risk that eliminating tax concessions available to wage earners 
without limiting practices used by non-wage earners to minimise their 
tax obligations would create a significant political backlash and lead many 
taxpayers to question the fairness of the Australian tax system. Unfortunately 
if the Howard Government’s reluctance to tighten the taxation treatment 
of trusts is any guide, then it would seem unlikely that policy makers have 
the will to introduce politically difficult reforms to Australia’s income tax 
system (Eccleston 2004, 161-164). Yet without such reforms, the task of 
justifying and eliminating WRDs would be all the more difficult.
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THE DILEMMA OF TAXPAYER PERCEPTIONS
Another factor which would complicate the politics of eliminating WRDs 
is the widely held misconception among taxpayers about the nature of 
the tax system and amount of tax they pay.  The crux of the problem, 
in so far as broadening the income tax base through the elimination of 
WRDs is concerned, is the general confusion in relation to the difference 
between tax deductions (or allowances)8 and tax offsets. The issue arises 
because anecdotal evidence suggests that many taxpayers wrongly believe 
that claimable deductions are subtracted from their tax liability (as is the 
case with offsets) rather than from their taxable income. This is significant 
because it results in taxpayers overestimating the extent of the tax subsidy 
of WRDs and subsequently over-valuing  this concession. While I’m not 
aware of detailed Australian survey evidence on this issue, the fact that, in 
2002-03, 440, 000 of the 1.8 million taxpayers with a taxable income less 
than $10,000 (many of whom would have no taxable income) claimed 
work-related deductions averaging $420, tends to support the argument 
(ATO 2005b, Table 15, Part C). If there is widespread confusion in relation 
to the true value of WRDs it would be consistent with international 
evidence dating back to the 1970s which suggests that the vast majority 
of taxpayers have little idea about how much tax they pay and the way in 
which income tax systems work (Lewis 1978). While such misconceptions 
tend to favour the case for tax cuts, with optimistic taxpayers believing they 
will benefit more that they actually do, it seems this dynamic works against 
the political case for reforming WRDs, with taxpayers overestimating the 
benefit of deductions.9
THE CULTURE OF TAX DEDUCTIONS
There is a great deal of evidence to support the claim that taxpayers are 
less than rational in the sense implied by classical economic theory. In 
fact given the complexity of Australia’s income tax system, actors may be 
intentionally irrational (North 1990), believing that it is not worth the 
effort to inform themselves in relation to the intricacies of the tax law (and 
8 The ATO use the term ‘deduction’ to describe an expense which can be subtracted 
from taxable income. It should be noted that the OECD use the terms ‘allowance’ 
rather than deduction.
9 An example of this were the recent capital gains tax cuts in the United States in 
which a poll revealed that 40% of American taxpayers believed they would benefit 
from the cuts when in fact ‘almost all of the benefits went to the wealthiest 1% of the 
population. (Stiglitz 2003).
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hence the need for professional advice). This, however does not mean that 
taxpayers are completely ignorant of and oblivious to the tax system. Instead, 
it is more accurate to regard taxpayers as possessing what Herbert Simon 
(1977) described as ‘bounded rationality’, with their interests shaped by a 
combination of rational evidence and social norms, established traditions 
and past experience. This implies that established traditions and cultural 
perceptions are important in shaping the interests of taxpayers and voters.
A significant problem confronting proponents of WRD reform is that 
the practice of claiming deductions so that tax withheld through the PAYE 
system exceeds the final tax obligation (resulting in a refund), has become 
ritualised among the vast majority of Australian wage earners. The extent 
to which Australians cherish these annual lump sum contributions to 
their household budget has been reflected in recent debate concerning 
the clawing back of family payments through the tax system (Pedic et al 
2000, Wroe 2004). Similarly, related proposals to eliminate tax returns have 
been given a cool reception because they would increase the likelihood of 
taxpayers being issued with end-of-financial year tax liabilities. In short, 
despite being ‘irrational’, the vast majority of Australian wage earners 
cherish their annual tax return and regard it as being an important financial 
windfall (Evans 2004, 179). Given that eliminating of WRDs would 
decrease or eliminate such refunds, it represents a significant political risk 
to reformers, although such risks could be mitigated through re-calibrating 
withholding rates or by providing taxpayers with a modest tax credit in lieu 
of the existing WRDs (Tran-Nam 2004).
TRANSITIONAL ISSUES
The political problems outlined above relate to the likely perceptions of 
taxpayers that they will be worse off if WRDs were eliminated. Beyond this 
political discontent, such perceptions may have an impact on the economic 
behaviour of the taxpayers concerned, and this would have implications 
in the real economy. First and foremost, there is a real risk that taxpayers 
who lose such concessions may seek compensatory wage claims (Warren 
2004, 159). This risk, and its implications for inflation and monetary 
policy, reinforce the arguments raised previously about the need to design 
associated income tax cuts such that they provide compensation for the 
elimination of WRDs.
There would also be countless specific economic effects related to such 
reforms. For example, depending on firms’ ability to pay and the bargaining 
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power of workers, employers may not subsidise the cost of work-related 
travel and uniforms in the absence of a tax subsidy. Bargaining theory 
dictates that it will be the least powerful and most vulnerable workers 
who would have to meet such expenses out of private income. Similarly 
the removal of WRDs may lead to an under-investment in public goods 
such as education, training and safety equipment, although, as noted above, 
government could design more transparent means of achieving such 
policy goals. Perhaps the most interesting issue given the current industrial 
relations debate is that the elimination of WRDs would end the existing 
subsidy for trade union membership and other professional associations – 
an outcome which presumably would be attractive to the current Howard 
Government.
Conclusion
This article has outlined arguments for and against the elimination of 
WRDs. The broad argument has been that the elimination of WRDs 
represents good taxation policy in that it would create a more neutral and 
market conforming personal tax base if the revenue saved was devoted to 
appropriate income tax cuts. However, it also worth noting that there has 
been a tendency in the recent Australian debate to overstate the economic 
benefits of flattening the personal income tax base. This point was made 
recently by Nobel Laureate and former Chief Economist of the World 
Bank Joseph Stiglitz: ‘The myth that lower taxes would unleash huge 
increases in savings and work effort has proved remarkably resistance to 
evidence’ (2003, 277). 
The reality of course is that personal decisions about when and where 
to work are influenced by a host of factors and serious research suggests 
that, with the exception of a few segments of the labour market (such as 
women returning to work after caring for their children), marginal tax rates 
are well down the list of variables that influences labour supply. Putting 
debates about the merits of broadening the income tax base aside, this 
paper argues that there are inherent benefits associated with eliminating 
WRDs, such as simplifying Australia’s income tax system, improving the 
culture of compliance among taxpayers and reducing their costs associated 
with managing their tax affairs.
Despite the fact that a strong case can be made for eliminating WRDs, 
the paper has been more sober in terms of the political prospects of 
achieving such reforms. A combination of collective action problems and 
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perceived concerns about the elimination of WRDs would pose significant 
political challenges, even for a well-designed reform package. Given recent 
Australian and comparative experience, what are the prospects of the 
Howard government successfully meeting such challenges? 
Looking abroad, there are some examples of Governments being able 
to meet these challenges successfully eliminating WRDs. For example, 
the historical Tax Reform Act (1986) in the United States eliminated many 
itemised work-related deductions, with compensation being provided 
through a combination of rate cuts and an increase in the general tax 
exemption (which works in similar manner to the Australian tax free 
threshold) (Tanzi 1987, Shoven 1990). While this example is significant, it 
must be seen in the specific context of the politics of the times, in which 
there was an unprecedented bi-partisan, cross-class coalition for tax reform 
on the back of a broad consensus that the tax system was in crisis. It is 
interesting to note that since 1986 pragmatic law makers have restored 
many itemised deductions reinforcing the claims made in this article about 
the political challenges associated with eliminating WRDs (Slemrod & 
Bakija 2004).10
New Zealand also provides an interesting case for the way in which 
WRDs are treated. Reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s eliminated almost 
all personal income tax deductions, leaving New Zealand with one of 
the ‘cleanest’ personal income tax systems in the world (OECD 2001). In 
terms of the politics, it is important to note that for a host of institutional 
reasons (a unitary state with a unicameral parliament) that New Zealand 
governments have considerably more capacity to push through contentious 
reforms relative to their Australian or American counterparts. In many ways 
this explains the speed and scope of the neo-liberal reforms experienced 
in New Zealand over the period. While there was ‘some controversy’ 
associated with the abolition of income tax deductions in New Zealand 
(Evans 2004, 175), there have been more widespread political repercussions 
associated with flattening of the personal income tax base more generally, 
which according to the OECD, has resulted in the ‘various positive features 
of the system gradually being eroded’ (OECD 2001, 4) This analysis tends 
to support the view that short of a crisis of confidence in the tax system 
10 It is important to note that the US income tax base is much more complicated than 
in Australia. For example, interest payment on home mortgages, health expenses, state 
taxes are all deductible.
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or an unusual consensus for reform, the politics of eliminating WRDs is 
difficult.
Based on historical experience there is little cause for optimism that 
an Australian government would be willing to confront the political 
obstacles associated with the elimination of WRDs. The Australian state 
is institutionally fragmented and opponents of reform have a number of 
veto options. Indeed the history of tax reform in Australia over the past 
thirty years has shown that significant base-broadening measures (such as 
the GST) have only been successfully implemented after the formation 
of a broad reform coalition (Eccleston 2004). The fact that similar, yet less 
politically less ambitious reforms, such as limiting the use of discretionary 
trusts for tax planning purposes, were abandoned, does not bode well for 
such a proposal. Finally, one of the central motivations for advocating 
the elimination of WRDs is to provide the means to funding reforms 
to the personal income tax base. The fact that Commonwealth revenue 
continues to exceed expectations removes the immediate need to fund 
such reforms through contentious base-broadening measures. Given the 
analysis presented in this article, the more politically expedient strategy 
may be to continue to fund income tax rate cuts from the burgeoning 
budget surplus. This would suggest that the sacred cow of WRDs may be 
safe for the time being.
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